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INTRODUCTION
From the distance of more than two hundred years, casual consideration of “the Founding” of American
institutions tends to convey the impression of a defining discrete moment in time, the outcome of an
epiphany experienced by the cadre of extraordinary individuals who established those early rules and
standards. The intellectual property clause of the constitution especially might project this aura of
inevitability because it was passed unanimously and without debate, with the intent to “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Instead, a closer examination reveals a less coherent
narrative, featuring conflicts among key players, political and personal compromises, and the evolution of
views and doctrines over the years. In short, it is worth noting that the Founding was not a moment, but a
process, and the Founders’ choices were initially expansive and fluid, before crystallizing into a system of
patents and copyrights that was unique in its objective and structure relative to any other in the world then
and since.
The individuals who met in Philadelphia for the Constitutional Convention of 1787 clearly did not
start with a blank slate nor with a well-defined consensus. The Articles of Confederation were a starting
point for a number of political and economic issues, but this document failed to address questions of
innovation and intellectual property. Instead, the policies that were introduced in the Constitution and the
statutes that elaborated on the constitutional clause were developed from, and in reaction to, an array of
other sources. These included the example of other countries (especially France and England), the
experience of the American colonies and states, personal views of influential members of the convention,
and (more diffusely) the writings of political economists and philosophers.
The framers of the U.S. Constitution and the early statutes were undoubtedly familiar with
historical events and with the contemporary European model of intellectual property. Yet, they chose to
make important changes in the parameters of property rights in invention (broadly defined), including how2
and to whom they were awarded. Their revealed objectives were to provide more widespread access to
such property rights, to facilitate the diffusion of information to the general public, and to develop markets
in inventive rights and inventions. If the design of institutions mattered in the direction they predicted, then
these “founding choices” in the realm of patents, copyrights and innovation policies enhanced the rate and
direction of economic, technological and cultural change.
This chapter assesses the options initially available, those exercised, and the consequences of the
paths taken in the realm of intellectual property and innovation. The first section traces the early European
use of exclusive privileges to promote the introduction of books, manufacturing and machine inventions.
The next section examines the nature of colonial laws and policies regarding patents, copyrights and
innovation, and that is followed by an account of the experiences of the American states between
independence and 1787. These precursors ultimately led to the intellectual property clause of the U.S.
Constitution, and the two major patent and copyright statutes that were enacted in 1790 to “promote the
progress of science and useful arts.” The final section summarizes the evolution of the intellectual property
system, and briefly considers the consequences of these “Founding Choices” for economic and social
development in the United States.
I. EUROPEAN PRECEDENTS
The fundamental element of property rights in invention (broadly defined to include new and improved
machines, processes, and cultural products) comprises a right to exclude, and such exclusive rights can be
traced back to classical antiquity. Early rights of exclusion were associated with royal and state-created
“privileges.” The privilege system did not explicitly distinguish between exclusive rights for mechanical
inventions and restrictions on rights to copy such items as books and music. Moreover, such proprietary
rights were not necessarily associated with novelty and innovation. Instead, privileges tended to establish
monopolies in a wide variety of areas, from intellectual endeavours to manufactured products, as well as
barriers to entry in guilds and occupations. The notion of rights in intellectual products, that could be
protected through exclusion or trade secrecy, emerged more clearly during the medieval period. Privileges
for books and new inventions were frequently granted in fifteenth-century Venice and Florence, but the3
most notorious and widespread use of such policy devices occurred later in France and England in the
sixteenth century.
Books and other written matter were initially regarded as part of the public domain when they were
published, but replication rights in cultural products became more significant after the invention of
mechanical means of printing. Privileges for both books and inventions were noted in the Republic of
Venice in the fifteenth century, a practice which was soon prevalent in a number of other European
jurisdictions. For instance, Donatus Bossius, a Milanese author, petitioned the duke in 1492 for an
exclusive privilege for his book. successfully argued that he would be unjustly deprived of the benefits from
his efforts if others were able to freely copy his work, and obtained a privilege for a term of ten years.
However, authorship was not required for the grant of a privilege, and printers and publishers acquired
monopolies over existing books as well as new works. Such privileges were granted on a case by case basis
by a number of different authorities: grantors included religious orders and authorities, universities, political
figures, and the representatives of the Crown. The rights they offered varied in geographical scope,
duration, and breadth of coverage, as well as in terms of the attendant penalties for their violation.
The extensive French privilege system allowed protection for books or translations, maps, type
designs, engravings and artwork, dance, opera and musical performances. Exclusive rights in printed
material were introduced in 1498 and such grants were well-established by the end of the sixteenth century
(Armstrong 1990). Privileges were under the auspices of the monarch, and generally were given for a brief
period of two to three years although the term could be as much as ten years or in perpetuity. Petitioners
paid formal fees and informal gratuities to the officials concerned. The courts sometimes imposed limits on
the rights conferred, such as stipulations about the prices that could be charged, and the region in which
they applied. Privileges were property that could be assigned or licensed to another party, and their
infringement could be punished by fines, imprisonment or confiscation of the output of “pirates.” By the
late eighteenth century an extensive administrative procedure was in place that was designed to restrict the
number of presses and facilitate the state’s surveillance and censorship of the publishing industry.
A French decree of 1777 established that authors who did not alienate their property were entitled
to exclusive rights in perpetuity, but made a distinction in the rights accorded to publishers. Few authors4
had the will or resources to publish and distribute books, so their privileges were likely to be sold outright
to professional publishers, in which case the privilege was only accorded a limited duration, the exact term
to be determined in accordance with the value of the work or the influence of the petitioner. Once the
publisher’s term expired the work passed into the public domain. Between 1700 and 1789, more than 2,500
petitions for exclusive privileges in books were filed, and about two thirds were granted. The result was a
system that resulted in “odious monopolies,” higher prices and greater scarcity, large transfers of revenues
to officials of the Crown and their allies, and pervasive censorship.
England similarly experienced a period during which book privileges were granted. A momentous
royal charter in 1557 authorized the formation of the Worshipful Company of Stationers, a publishers’ guild
that would control the book trade for more than two hundred years. This company created and controlled
the right of their constituent members to make copies, so in effect their “copy right” was a private property
right that existed in perpetuity, independently of state or statutory rights. The Stationers’ Company
maintained a register of books, issued licenses, and sanctioned individuals who violated their regulations.
Enforcement and regulation were carried out by the corporation itself through its Court of Assistants. Thus,
in both England and France, copyright law began as a monopoly grant to benefit and regulate the printers’
guilds, and as a means of surveillance and censorship over public opinion on behalf of the Crown.
The English system of book privileges was replaced in 1710 by a copyright statute (the “Statute of
Anne”). The statute intended to restrain the publishing industry and destroy its monopoly power. It was
not directed toward authors and had little to do with questions of rewards for creativity. According to this
landmark law, copyright was available to anyone, not just to the Stationers. Instead of a perpetual right, the
term was limited to fourteen years, with a right of renewal, after which the work would enter the public
domain. Subsequent litigation and judicial interpretation added a new and fundamentally different
dimension to copyright. In order to protect their perpetual copyright, publishers promoted the idea that
copyright was based on the natural rights of authors or creative individuals. If indeed copyrights derived
from these inherent principles, they represented property that existed independently of statutory provisions
and could be protected at common law in perpetuity. As the supposed agent of the author, those rights
would devolve to the publisher. The booksellers engaged in a series of strategic litigation that culminated5
in their defeat in the landmark case, Donaldson v. Beckett [98 Eng. Rep. 257 (1774)]. The court ruled that
authors did possess a common law right in their unpublished works, but on publication that right was
extinguished by the statute, whose provisions determined the nature and scope of any copyright claims.
The transition from publishers’ rights to statutory authors’ rights was perhaps more based on
perception than reality, but it had fundamental implications for the ease with which expansions in such
property rights could be defended on the grounds of creativity and personhood. This tension between
publishers and authors would recur in the American context, but with less force, because the colonies
openly emphasized the pragmatic need to facilitate learning and the diffusion of “useful knowledge,” rather
than to reward cultural elites who exhibited “genius and creativity.”
A similar historical process can be discerned in the development of patents for invention. The
modern patent grant also emerged out of Venetian privileges, perhaps as early as the thirteenth century, but
certainly by the fifteenth century the practice of granting exclusive rights for inventions was well
established. Novelty was not a requirement, and patents could be granted for foreign innovations that were
being introduced by an importer. Many of these early grants comprised petitions that were approved on an
individual basis, but a landmark statute in 1474 allowed exclusive rights to authors and inventors for ten
years. Despite these precursors at law, Britain stands out for having established a statutory patent system
which has been in continuous operation for a longer period than any other in the world. This patent system
was an outgrowth of a régime of privileges, whereby the English Crown bestowed vast numbers of
monopoly rights in order to raise revenues and to reward favourites. These ultimately caused vociferous
popular protests against “odious monopolies” that included specific products and industries, trades and
occupations from alehouses to apothecaries, as well as printing and publishing. At the same time, the
common law deprecated monopolies, but also supported the principle that new inventions and risky
ventures deserved protection for a limited time in order to benefit the common good.
The Commons finally succeeded in a petition that outlawed all monopolies, with the exception of
new inventions. The Statute of Monopolies in 1624 codified existing common law policies, by authorizing
patent grants for fourteen years for “the sole making or working of any manner of new manufacture within
this realm to the first and true inventor...so they be not contrary to the law nor mischievous to the State by6
raising of the prices of commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient.”
1 The “first and
true inventor” was interpreted to include introducers of inventions that had been created abroad, and the
roster of successful patentees included employers of the actual inventor, as well as patent agents applying
on behalf of their customers. These grants were viewed as monopolies; as such, they were grudgingly
granted and narrowly construed and circumscribed.
Another important feature of the British patent system was that it established significant barriers
that deliberately limited access to property rights in invention. The application costs were prohibitively
high relative to per capita income. Inventors who wished to obtain protection throughout the realm had to
contend with the bureaucracy of three patent systems, and to pay fees that ranged from £100 for an English
patent to more than £300 for property rights that extended to Ireland and Scotland. The complicated system
also effectively inhibited the diffusion of information and made it difficult, if not impossible, for inventors
outside of London to readily conduct patent searches. The cumbersome system (variously described as
“mediaeval” and “fantastical”) afforded ample material for satire, but imposed severe constraints on the
ordinary inventor who wished to obtain protection for his discovery. Attitudes toward patents were imbued
with the distaste felt for speculation, and restrictions on trade in stocks were extended to markets in patent
rights.
European states offered a large array of inducements and rewards for innovation, in addition to
rights of exclusion in the form of patent and copyright grants. These included a proliferation of institutions
directed toward the “the encouragement of arts and manufactures.” A board for that purpose was
established in Edinburgh in 1727, and in England the Society for the Encouragement of Arts and
Manufactures was founded in 1754, according to a plan published by Benjamin Franklin. In particular,
French policies toward inventions and innovations in the eighteenth century are worth a close examination,
because they comprised a cornucopia of rewards and incentives that illustrate the relative benefits and costs
of alternative routes to statutory grants of intellectual property rights. During this period inventors or
introducers of inventions could benefit from titles, pensions that sometimes extended to spouses and
offspring, loans (some interest-free), lump-sum and land grants, bounties or subsidies for production,
1 21 Jac. I. C. 3, 1623, Sec. 6.7
exemptions from taxes, and monopoly privileges. Exclusive rights could extend to a specific region or
throughout the entire kingdom, and their term varied from five years to perpetuity.
This portfolio of policy instruments provides insights into the efficacy of awards that were
administered by the state on a case by case basis. On occasion, prior examination by a committee of
qualified individuals was required before applicants could receive awards, and led to the encouragement
and introduction of productive technologies. Nevertheless, such grants and privileges were typically
capricious and based on non-economic criteria. Eighteenth-century correspondence and records provide
numerous examples of awards that were made based on court connections. At the other end of the spectrum
large sums were awarded to the “deserving” on the basis of arbitrary factors such as age, deportment,
religious piety or family need. Members of the board of examiners, even if scientifically trained, were not
necessarily qualified to assess their potential commercial value. Should the privilege actually prove to be
commercially successful, active trade in the rights was inhibited because prior permission had to be secured.
Moreover, the administrative and opportunity costs of such a system were nontrivial on the part of both
supplicants and the state bureaucracy. Applicants were well aware of the political dimension of innovation
(Hilaire-Pérez 2000). They were also aware that promises made as inducements were not necessarily
enforceable once the inventor had made fixed investments.
II. AMERICAN COLONIES
Any genealogy of eighteenth-century legal codes undoubtedly branches from the seeds of the first
colonial governments in America.
2 Colonial legislators did not “dismantle” European legal rules and
standards, as popular histories frequently propose. Neither did they slavishly replicate the institutions and
practices that prevailed in other countries. Observers have been impressed by the fluidity of the colonial
legal institutions and the extent to which they responded to the needs of society.
3 One can detect the
influence of the principles and customs of the Old World, but at the same time institutional innovation
necessarily occurred to encompass the circumstances that prevailed in the New World. The colonies
2 “The whole structure of our political institutions is the natural production of the principles laid down by the founders
of the several States,” according to Towle (1871, p. 297).
3 This observation is not intended to imply that the law teleogically evolved toward an efficient outcome, nor to
underestimate the way in which the interests of certain parties, including slaves and Native Americans, were subsumed
in those of the dominant socioeconomic groups.8
initially followed a similar model to Europe, allowing monopolies and privileges in the form of patents of
introduction, as well as other encouragements for infant enterprises and imported discoveries, and later
offered exclusive rights solely for novel contributions.
The original American colonies were subject to the laws of Britain and the terms of their charters,
but they also had considerable leeway in their ability to adapt and introduce rules that were more
appropriate to domestic circumstances. For instance, the 1691 Charter of the Massachusetts Bay
Commonwealth stated that self-government implied the adoption of colonial laws as long as they were “not
repugnant or contrary to the Lawes of this our Realme of England.” Similarly, the Carolina Charter of 1663
granted full discretion, “Provided nevertheless, that the said laws be consonant to reason, and as near as
may be conveniently, agreeable to the laws and customs of this our kingdom of England.” The original
colonies introduced legal rules and institutions that differed from each other at the time of their
establishment, but the laws and their enforcement gradually coalesced and converged. They tended in large
part toward the Massachusetts and Virginia models but, in any event, the new American legal order
ultimately deviated substantively from their European precedents, especially in the realm of patents and
copyrights.
A frequent and significant source of conflict between England and the colonies related to economic
policy, including the efforts to promote American innovation at the expense of imports from Europe.
4 Sir
Ferdinando Gorges was awarded the monopoly of fishing in New England in the 1620s, but his privilege
was never enforced because of protests in the colonies. The colonies were somewhat ambivalent about
employing the policy and practice of exclusive rights themselves. On the one hand, the settlers avowed an
aversion to monopolies such as the Gorges grant, and the 1629 charter of the Massachusetts Bay Company
repeatedly stressed that the colonists “shall have full and free Power and Liberty to continue and use their
said Trade of Fishing.” In December 1641 the General Court of the colony of Massachusetts adopted "The
Body of Liberties", the first code of laws enacted in New England.
5 In particular, the ninth clause is
4 Rhode Island repealed a 1751 act to offer bounties for woolen textiles for fear that “it may draw the displeasure of
Great Britain upon us, as it will interfere with their most favorite manufactory.” According to Clark, the colonies
offered bounties for flax instead in order not to antagonize the British wool manufacturing interests (Clark 1916, 34-
35).
5 Nathan Ward, an emigrant from England, compiled this remarkable document. Ward, a minister of the church, and a
graduate of Emmanuel College of Cambridge University, had also studied and practiced law in England.9
noticeably similar to the Statue of Monopolies: “9. No monopolies shall be granted or allowed amongst us,
but of such new Inventions that are profitable to the Country, and that for a short time.”
6
On the other hand, numerous monopoly grants mimicked the privileges that were outlawed by the
British Statute of Monopolies in 1624. A few months before the passage of the Body of Liberties, the
Massachusetts Bay Colony granted Samuel Winslow a 1641 patent for the monopoly right to produce salt
using a new method for ten years, but it is unclear whether he had devised the invention or merely imported
it.
7 Salt was important to the colonists and, despite the code, similar awards were made in subsequent
years, including a 1656 monopoly to Governor Winthrop’s son for yet another method of making salt.
Exclusive rights were also permitted for merchants who introduced methods from overseas that were new to
the colony. John Clark was even allowed to retain in perpetuity the monopoly right to charge 10 shillings
per family for use of his stove invention. Some of the patents specified the prices that were to be charged
and the quantities. Others included stipulations such as local residency: in April 1641, the town of
Plymouth agreed to allow John Jenny and his partners the exclusive rights to make salt for twenty one
years, provided that he sold the salt for two shillings a bushel, and did not assign the right to any resident
from outside the town. Dirck de Wolff was given a similar privilege to produce salt in New Netherlands in
1661. However, the Dutch colonists exhibited an aversion to monopoly grants “as it is in our opinion a very
pernicious management, principally so in a new and budding State, whose population and welfare can not
be promoted but through general benefits and privileges, in which every one … either as a merchant or a
mechanic, may participate” (cited in Clark 1916, p. 47). This emphasis on open access would be reflected
in later conceptions of a uniquely American system.
The colonial legislatures enacted statutes that were designed to protect and encourage domestic
manufactures, including an extensive portfolio of such policy instruments as tariffs, loans, bounties,
premiums and subsidies. In 1621 the Virginia Company induced William Norton and his family to
immigrate with four Italian artisans to the New World in order to manufacture glass, in part to produce
6 The document consisted of ninety eight clauses, a preamble and a conclusion, largely drawn from biblical
admonitions and British precedents. These principles comprised the major structure of laws in the colony for much of
the rest of the seventeenth century. Clause 9 was preserved in p. 62 of the Acts of 1660 and p. 119 of the Acts of 1672
(Whitmore 1890).
7 The grant was qualified by a working requirement to establish a factory within one year, and also allowed others to
make salt using different methods from the one covered by the patent.10
beads to trade with the natives. He was accorded a seven-year privilege for the exclusive manufacturing
rights, royalties, and free land; transportation costs, expenses and tools were provided as well (Brock 1999,
130). Premiums were a popular instrument for encouraging manufactures, such as an award William Penn
offered for the highest quality linen made in the colony. Maryland funded its premiums for superior textile
products through annual taxes at the county level. However, individual donations and subscriptions also
paid for prizes, especially later in the eighteenth century. Virginia tried in 1759 (apparently with limited
success) to found a corporation “for encouraging arts and manufactures” to offer prizes for discoveries new
to the colony.
Another important innovation for the early colonists, sawmills, were the subject of the first patent in
the modern sense of protecting new manufacturing processes and mechanical inventions. The General
Court of Massachusetts granted a monopoly in 1646 to Joseph Jenks for fourteen years, for his
improvements in water mills and the manufacture of scythes: “for a newly invented sawmill that things may
be afforded cheaper than formerly, and that for fourteen years without disturbance by any others setting up
the like invention so that his study and cost may not be in vain or lost, so as power is still left to restrain the
exportation of such manufactures, and to moderate the prices thereof if occasion so require.”
8 In 1655
Jenks was issued exclusive rights for another scythe “for the more speedy cutting of grass, for seven years.”
Like Massachusetts, Connecticut adopted a code of laws that included a clause regarding
monopolies, and in 1672 declared its intention to encourage the importation of foreign methods of
manufactures. The legislators established an examination board to assess the apparently large number of
applications that inventors and introducers submitted between 1708 and 1789, and made their decisions
based on “the comparative importance of the discovery claimed, or the branch of manufactures proposed to
be introduced.” The term of the patents varied between three and fifteen years. For instance, in 1728
Samuel Higley and Joseph Dewey applied for patent rights for twenty years for improvements in steel
making; they were given an exclusive right for ten years, with a two-year probationary period during which
they were expected to improve “the art to any good and reasonable perfection” (Commissioner of Patents,
1850, 550). Many of the petitions stressed the cost to the inventor and the potential benefit to the public.
8 Jenks’ application referred to his “desire to improve this talent for the public good and benefit and service of this
country” (Defebaugh 1907, 185).11
When Benjamin Dearborn approached the New Hampshire legislature in 1786, he declared that “as your
petitioner has spent much time and money in a variety of inventions, which may be of public utility, he is
desirous of enjoying some exclusive benefit from some of them” (Commissioner of Patents, 1850, 577-8).
The special act granting him exclusive rights for 14 years also specified that infringers would have to pay a
penalty of double the value of the invention.
The southern colonies were also involved in offering inducements for inventive activity and
innovation. Notably, South Carolina passed a 1691 statute “for the better encouragement of the making of
engines for propagating the staples of this colony,” and early in the eighteenth century granted a number of
patents for machine inventions. In 1759 Virginia introduced “an act for encouraging arts and
manufactures,” which awarded prizes for new discoveries and the establishment of new manufacturing
industries (Clark 1916, p. 38). Similarly, Virginia’s “Plan for the encouragement of Arts and Manufactures
reported, and unanimously agreed to, Monday, March 27, 1775” urged that “as Salt is a daily and
indispensable necessary of life, and the making of it amongst ourselves must be deemed a valuable
acquisition, it is therefore recommended that the utmost endeavours be used to establish Salt Works, and
that proper encouragement be given to Mr. James Tait, who hath made proposals, and offered a scheme to
the publick, for so desirable a purpose.” The list of manufactured goods that the colony wished to
encourage included saltpeter, sulphur, gunpowder, cloth and nails. The convention “earnestly
recommended that Societies be formed in different parts of this Colony; and it is the opinion of this
Convention, that proper Premiums ought to be offered in the several Counties and Corporations, to such
persons as shall excel in the several branches of Manufactures.”
Privileges comprised part of an economic policy to enhance growth, often a protection analogous to
an infant industry subsidy, rather than a fulfillment of any abstract philosophical vision of natural rights.
The attitude of these early founders was echoed in a communication of Thomas Jefferson’s, dismissing the
natural rights argument with the statement that “it would be singular to admit a natural and even an
hereditary right to inventors.”
9 As such, the colonial legislatures frequently appended conditions to the
9 Thomas Jefferson’s letter to Isaac McPherson, August 13, 1813 further stated: “Stable ownership is the gift of social
law, and is given late in the progress of society. It would be curious then, if an idea, the fugitive fermentation of an
individual brain, could, of natural right, be claimed in exclusive and stable property. If nature has made any one thing
less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an12
privileges they granted, at the risk of annulment, including working requirements, price controls, assured
performance in such dimensions as quantity or quality, and geographical limits on the scope of the
monopoly. The patent granted to the Jerom brothers in 1746 to make sea salt in Connecticut would be
revoked unless they consistently produced stipulated quantities. Edward Hinman’s 1717 patent for making
molasses from corn stalks required that the product should be as good and as cheap as the imports from the
West Indies.
Both conceptually and in practice, European and colonial histories of privileges and monopolies
often bundled exclusive rights without distinguishing between mechanical inventions and cultural
inventions. Pennsylvania’s Frame of Government in April 1683 presciently declared that it intended to
“erect and order all public schools, and encourage and reward the authors of useful sciences and laudable
inventions in the said province.” Benjamin Dearborn’s 1786 grant from New Hampshire bundled a patent
for two mechanical inventions with copyright protection for a math textbook. In most other colonies
authors applied for special legislative favours, such as John Usher’s successful appeal to the Massachusetts
General Court, for a printing monopoly in The Book of General Lawes and Liberties. His 1672 patent
ensured for seven years “That no Printer shall print any more Coppies than are agreed and paid for by the
owner of the Coppie or Coppies, nor shall he nor any other reprint or make Sale of any of the same without
the said Owner’s consent upon the forfeiture and penalty of treble the whole charges of Printing and paper
of the quantity paid for by the owner of the Coppie, to the said owner or his Assigns.” This “patent” may
be regarded as the first formal de facto copyright to be granted in the American colonies.
III. STATE PRECEDENTS
individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into
the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one
possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives
instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me….
Considering the exclusive right to invention as given not of natural right, but for the benefit of society, I know well the
difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent,
and those which are not. As a member of the patent board for several years, while the law authorized a board to grant
or refuse patents, I saw with what slow progress a system of general rules could be matured.” Jefferson’s attitude
varied over time, from a rejection of monopoly rights (which he thought should have been included in a bill of rights),
to a limited acceptance. In July 1788 he wrote to Madison that “The saying that there shall be no monopolies, lessens
the incitements to ingenuity, which is spurred on by the hope of a monopoly for a limited time, as of fourteen years;
but the benefit of even limited monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their general suppression,”
(Jefferson 1900, 582). Later in an 1807 letter to Oliver Evans, he opined that the patent term should be longer than the
English grant, to take into account the undeveloped state of the American economy.13
Intellectual property issues were not addressed in the Articles of Confederation, but the notion of securing
protection for authors and inventors was in circulation in the press, in legislatures, and in Congress. In
January 1783 a Connecticut representative to Congress, Oliver Wolcott, asserted in a letter that “he ever
was of Opinion that the Copy Rights of every Author ought to be secured to him under certain Limitations,”
and later the same year noted that he intended “to secure if I can to Authors their Copy Rights--for Some
Time past Congress have been too much Occupied by important Subjects to introduce a Matter of this
Nature” (Smith 1976-2000).
10 This might seem to imply that such policies were not regarded as significant
but, as Madison (1788) pointed out, “The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of
authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to useful
inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases
with the claims of individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual provisions for either of the
cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of
Congress” (Madison 1788).
Indeed, after the Revolution, Congress prompted the individual states to formalize policies toward
inventors and authors. Notably, in May 1783 the Colonial Congress recommended that the states “secure to
the authors or publishers of any new books not hitherto printed, being citizens of the United States… the
copy right of such books for a certain time not less than fourteen years from the first publication” (Sorvald
1900). That year, Connecticut became the first state to approve an “Act for the encouragement of literature
and genius” because “it is perfectly agreeable to the principles of natural equity and justice, that every
author should be secured in receiving the profits that may arise from the sale of his works, and such security
may encourage men of learning and genius to publish their writings; which may do honor to their country,
and service to mankind.” Although this preamble might seem to strongly favour authors’ rights, the statute
also specified that books were to be offered at reasonable prices and in sufficient quantities, or else a
compulsory license would issue.
10 See also Paine (1782): “It is more than probable, notwithstanding the declarations it contains, that the copy was
obtained for the sake of profiting by the sale of a new and popular work… It may with propriety be remarked, that in
all countries where literature is protected, and it never can flourish where it is not, the works of an author are his legal
property; and to treat letters in any other light than this, is to banish them from the country, or strangle them in the
birth.”14
Between 1783 and 1786 all of the original states, with the exception of Delaware, likewise
complied by enacting copyright laws. These statutes tended to articulate the utilitarian objectives of their
legislatures, claiming that copyright was needed in order to encourage learning and education.
Pennsylvania’s statute was intended “for the encouragement and promotion of learning” and directed
toward “useful books.” The copyright declaration of the state of New York also included plans to fund an
educational academy in Kings County. North Carolina echoed the common theme that “it is proper that
men should be encouraged to pursue useful knowledge by the hope of reward; and … the security of literary
property must greatly tend to encourage genius, to promote useful discoveries, and to the general extension
of arts and commerce.”
In keeping with these social objectives, and to ameliorate any monopolistic consequences, many of
the clauses included restrictions on the rights of the copyright holder. South Carolina’s “Act For the
Encouragement of Arts and Sciences” granted any person who wished to print a copy of a new or existing
book “the sole right and liberty of printing such book and books, for the term of fourteen years,” on
registration with the secretary of the state. However, this exclusive right did not extend to books in foreign
languages from overseas. Copyrighted books had to be sold at a reasonable price, or else a compulsory
license could be issued at the discretion of the courts. Similarly, Georgia’s law noted that “it is equally
necessary for the encouragement of learning, that the inhabitants of this State be furnished with useful
books, &c., at reasonable prices.” Massachusetts offered authors exclusive rights for twenty-one years, with
a depository requirement.
11 North Carolina’s statute allowed for the reprinting of foreign materials, and
echoed the censorship of British laws by prohibiting copyrights in “books, maps or charts which may be
dangerous to civil liberty, or to the peace or morals of society.”
Although the majority of states enacted laws toward copyright after 1783, only South Carolina
appended a general statement that included patent grants. South Carolina’s “Act For the Encouragement of
Arts and Sciences” allowed that “the inventors of useful machines shall have a like exclusive privilege of
11 The Preamble to the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Ch. 5, Sec. 2 proclaimed: “Wisdom and knowledge, as
well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and
liberties; and as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of education in the various parts of the
country, and among the different orders of the people, it shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future
periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences;… to encourage private societies
and public institutions, rewards and immunities, for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades,
manufactures….”15
making or vending their machines for the like term of fourteen years,” under the same terms as for owners
of copyrights. However, this did not imply that patents were automatically available, since inventions were
still obtained through ad hoc legislative instruments that responded to petitions filed by specific individuals.
As in the case of copyright protection for books, the legislatures conditioned the patent grants on
compliance with conditions, such as maximum prices, compulsory licensing and working requirements.
In 1786 a patent was granted to Peter Belin for “the exclusive right of constructing and vending
sundry useful water machines.” The patent made reference to the “labor, attention, hazard and expense” of
the petitioner, whose discoveries would be “of great utility to the citizens of this State.” Infringers would
have to pay 100 pounds in damages. The patentee had to file models with the authorities, and could not
refuse requests to build the water works at “a just and reasonable price” or else a compulsory license would
issue (Cooper 1838). In 1788 Samuel Knight obtained from the state of South Carolina “the exclusive right
of constructing and vending a machine for the pounding of rice” for fourteen years. The patentee was
required to deposit a model or “exact plan” with the secretary’s office, not to ensure an increase in social
knowledge, but for the specific purpose of preventing and proving unknowing infringement. Infringers
would be fined fifty pounds sterling, but at the same time Knight was obligated to issue a license at the set
fee of five pounds to anyone who applied. The preamble to another private act that day declared that
“authors and inventors should be secured in receiving the profits that may arise from the sale or disposal of
their respective writings and discoveries” (Cooper 1839, 69-70).
Several patentees obtained patent rights in more than one state. Henry Guest, a resident of New
Brunswick, received the exclusive right to make currier’s oil and blubber, from both the Pennsylvania and
New York legislatures. He deposited sealed samples and a description of his invention with the clerk of the
assembly. The New York law included a provision of treble damages for infringement. The act would not
take effect until the inventor filed “a writing containing the names and descriptions of the materials
aforesaid, and the method and process of making such blubber and oyl… nor until the said Henry Guest
shall have a manufactory erected for the purpose… within this state” (New York 1886, 780). The
steamship inventors, John Fitch, James Rumsey and Robert Fulton, and Robert Livingston (a promoter)
lobbied the states strongly to obtain monopoly rights in river transportation. However, the most insistent in16
trying to gain multi-state monopoly rights, before the advent of national laws, was the notorious Oliver
Evans. Between 1786 and 1789, Evans obtained patents for a series of inventions in flour mills and steam
wagons, from the legislatures of Pennsylvania, Maryland and New Hampshire.
Throughout the eighteenth century, states continued to offer premiums and subsidies for their
favoured manufactures. In 1775 the Continental Congress “recommended to the several Provincial
Conventions, to grant such premiums, for the refining of Sulphur in their respective Provinces, as may be
judged proper.” It was also suggested that public patronage should encourage the production of saltpeter.
A Committee of the Continental Congress similarly opined in 1783 that domestic manufactures were
important to avoid increasing the foreign debt, so it “recommended to the legislatures of the States to
countenance and encourage the establishment of useful manufactures either by premiums or by such other
means as they may find most effectual which are consistent with the Confederation…”(Ford 1905).
The influential Alexander Hamilton advocated an arsenal of commercial policies, including tariffs,
restrictions on exports, quotas, subsidies and bonuses, quality controls on manufactures and exports, and
improvements in infrastructure necessary for market expansion. He was also a strong supporter of the use of
premiums as an integral element in innovation policy.
12 In the critical year of 1787, Tench Coxe exhorted
the Pennsylvania Society for the Encouragement of Manufactures and the Useful Arts to “carefully examine
the conduct of other countries in order to possess ourselves of their methods of encouraging manufactories
and pursue such of them, as apply to our own situation” and, like his colleague Alexander Hamilton, he
recommended the adoption of premiums to achieve these ends. Pennsylvania was already noted for its
strong measures to advance manufactures, such as an 1788 Act “to Encourage and Protect the
12 See, for instance, the Report on Manufactures (1791), recommending a fund: “to defray the expences of the
emigration of Artists, and Manufacturers in particular branches of extraordinary importance--to induce the prosecution
and introduction of useful discoveries, inventions and improvements, by proportionate rewards, judiciously held out
and applied--to encourage by premiums both honorable and lucrative the exertions of individuals, And of classes, in
relation to the several objects, they are charged with promoting--and to afford such other aids to those objects, as may
be generally designated by law… The propriety of stimulating by rewards, the invention and introduction of useful
improvements, is admitted without difficulty. But the success of attempts in this way must evidently depend much on
the manner of conducting them. It is probable, that the placing of the dispensation of those rewards under some proper
discretionary direction, where they may be accompanied by collateral expedients, will serve to give them the surest
efficacy. It seems impracticable to apportion, by general rules, specific compensations for discoveries of unknown and
disproportionate utility… The operation and utility of premiums have been adverted to; together with the advantages
which have resulted from their dispensation, under the direction of certain public and private societies... It may
confidently be affirmed that there is scarcely any thing, which has been devised, better calculated to excite a general
spirit of improvement than the institutions of this nature. They are truly invaluable” (Syrett et al., eds, 1961, p.79).17
Manufacturers of this State,” which imposed fines and jail terms on “ill-designing persons” who exported
machines or devices or attempted to lure artisans to leave the country.
IV. FRAMING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME
The delegates who gathered in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 to draw up a blueprint to “promote the
general Welfare” had ample suggestions for how to proceed that they could extract from history, recent and
more distant. The document they finally produced included a succinct clause (Art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 8) to protect
the writings and discoveries of authors and inventors. It was notably the first time in history that an
intellectual property provision was included in a national constitution.
The intellectual property clause was not included in the first draft of the Constitution. Instead, the
debates record a list of related proposals, which were submitted on August 18 1787. These included
proposals "to secure to literary authors, their copyrights for a limited time," "to encourage, by proper
premiums and provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries," and "to grant patents for
useful inventions." It was also proposed "to establish public institutions, rewards and immunities, for the
promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades, and manufactures" (Farrand, ed, 1937). These provisions were
all familiar policy instruments that had prevailed in Europe and in the colonies themselves since the
seventeenth century. However, the convention rejected the bundling of incentives for invention and
innovation, because such powers were “deemed too broad and sweeping” and allowed overly expansive
discretion to the government.
13 The unique preamble to the intellectual property clause (“to promote the
progress of science and useful arts”) implied that private monopolies to benefit privileged individuals or
special groups were not to be permitted. Instead, the primary purpose was to encourage social welfare
through advances in knowledge and technology, and the means to achieve this objective was through the
temporary grant of exclusive rights to authors and inventors alone.
13 According to Story (1833, v. 2): “In regard to the rejection of the proposition in the convention "to establish
institutions, rewards, and immunities for the promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades, and manufactures… It is
notorious, that, in the convention, an attempt was made to introduce into the constitution a power to encourage
manufactures; but it was withheld. …it involved a direct power to establish institutions, rewards, and immunities for
all the great interests of society, and was, on that account, deemed too broad and sweeping. It would establish a
general, and not a limited power of government.”18
Some might speculate that the silence of the records on the proceedings regarding this clause
indicate that the matter was of little interest or import to the delegates. However, that hypothesis is
disproved by subsequent events. In the first address to Congress in 1790, George Washington urged: “The
advancement of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, by all proper means, will not, I trust, need
recommendation; but I cannot forbear intimating to you the expediency of giving effectual encouragement,
as well to the introduction of new and useful inventions from abroad as to the exertion of skill and genius at
home… Nor am I less persuaded, that you will agree with me in opinion, that there is nothing which can
better deserve your patronage, than the promotion of science and literature. Knowledge is, in every country,
the surest basis of public happiness.”
Congress quickly complied by passing a patent statute 10 April 1790.
14 The United States is noted
for creating the first modern patent institution in the world, a system whose features differed in significant
respects from those of other major countries. The individuals who shaped early American patent policy
were convinced that individuals responded to incentives. Accordingly, they carefully calibrated individual
features of the patent system to ensure that the system was effective in promoting inventive activity. This
orientation was evident at the highest levels (the inclusion of an intellectual property clause in the U.S.
Constitution) to the most detailed (provisions to enable patentees in rural areas to mail in their applications
without having to pay postage.) The conviction that the design of patent systems mattered was also shared
by the inventors themselves and by other participants in the market for technology.
The historical record indicates that the legislature’s creation of a uniquely American system was a
deliberate and conscious process. In the first place, a combined intellectual property bill, HR 10, was
tabled, and instead separate statutes were enacted for patents and copyrights. Second, the separate patent
bill laid before Congress, HR-41, was amended in several places. The most minor of these amendments is
suggestive: patents were to be granted in the name of the people of the United States rather than the
executive office. The draft of this patent bill echoed a number of other British practices, but the copy that
Washington later approved differed significantly from historical precedent, in ways that favoured the rights
of inventors. The House deleted Section 6, which had imitated the English policy of granting patents for
14 For accounts of the development of the American patent system see Bugbee (1967); Khan (2005); and Khan and
Sokoloff (2001).19
imported inventions. As Justice Joseph Story commented, the Constitution does not permit anyone other
than the true inventor to be benefited. The Senate extended the initial definition of novelty: the patent laws
still employed the language of the English statutes in allowing patents to the “first and true inventor” but,
unlike in England, the phrase was used literally to protect inventions that were new and original to the
world, not simply within domestic borders. A section regarding interferences (or conflicting applications)
was replaced by a stipulation that information about prior inventions should be readily available to potential
patentees. The Senate suggested forcing patentees to work the patent or else license others to do so, but the
House rejected this as an unwarranted infringement of the patentee’s rights. Moreover, small reductions
were made to the fee schedule, which was modest to begin with.
The basic parameters of the U.S. patent system were transparent and predictable, in itself an aid to
those who wished to obtain patent rights. The primary feature of the “American system” is that all
applications are subject to an examination for conformity with the laws and for novelty. An examination
system was set in place in 1790, when a select committee consisting of the Secretary of State (Thomas
Jefferson), the Attorney General and the Secretary of War scrutinized the applications. These duties
understandably proved to be too time-consuming for highly-ranked officials with other onerous duties, so
three years later it was replaced by a registration system. The validity of patents was left up to the district
courts, which had the power to set in motion a process that could end in the repeal of the patent. The laws
were enforced by a judiciary which was willing to grapple with difficult questions such as the extent to
which a democratic and market-oriented political economy was consistent with exclusive rights. Courts
explicitly attempted to implement decisions that promoted economic growth and social welfare.
15
Reforms in 1836 set in place the essential structure of the current patent system. In particular, the
1836 Patent Law established the Patent Office, whose trained and technically qualified employees were
authorized to examine applications. In order to constrain the ability of examiners to engage in arbitrary
actions, the applicant was given the right to file a bill in equity to contest the decisions of the Patent Office
with the further right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. American patent policy likewise
15 “The Constitution of the United States, in giving authority to Congress to grant patents for a limited period, declares
the object to be to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, an object as truly national and meritorious, and
well founded in public policy, as any which can possibly be within the scope of national protection.” Ames v. Howard,
1 Sumn. 485 (Mass.) 1833.20
stands out in its insistence on affordable fees. Such payments were not intended to exact a price for the
patent privilege or to raise revenues for the state – the disclosure of information was the price of the patent
property right – rather, they were imposed merely to cover the administrative expenses of the Office.
16 The
Patent Office itself was a source of centralized information on the state of the arts, and Congress was also
concerned with the question of providing for decentralized access to patent materials. Legislation ensured
that information about the stock of patented knowledge was readily available and diffused rapidly. As early
as 1805 Congress stipulated that the Secretary of State should publish an annual list of patents granted the
preceding year, and after 1832 also required the publication in newspapers of notices regarding expired
patents.
The American patent system was based on the presumption that patents for new inventions were not
monopolies, and that social welfare coincided with the individual welfare of inventors. Accordingly,
legislators emphatically rejected restrictions on the rights of American inventors. Working requirements or
compulsory licenses, standard measures of colonial legislatures to attenuate monopoly power, were
regarded as unwarranted infringements of the rights of “meritorious inventors,” and incompatible with the
philosophy of U.S. patent grants. Patentees were not required to pay annuities to maintain their property,
there were no opposition proceedings, and once granted a patent could not be revoked unless there was
evidence of fraud. One of the advantages of a system that secures property rights is that it facilitates
contracts and trade, and an extensive national network of licensing and assignments developed early on,
aided by legal rulings that overturned contracts for useless or fraudulent patents.
American patent laws provided strong protection for citizens of the United States, but varied over
time in its treatment of foreign inventors. The statutes of 1793, 1800 and 1832, restricted patent property to
citizens or to residents who declared that they intended to become citizens. As such, while an American
could not appropriate patent rights to a foreign invention, he could freely use the idea without any need to
16 The legislature debated the question of appropriate fees, and the first patent law in 1790 set the rate at the minimal
sum of $3.70 plus copy costs. In 1793 the fees were increased to $30, and were maintained at this level until 1861. In
that year, they were raised to $35, and the term was changed from fourteen years (with the possibility of an extension)
to seventeen years (with no extensions.) The 1869 Report of the Commissioner of Patents compared the $35 fee for a
US patent to the significantly higher charges in European countries such as Britain, France, Russia ($450), Belgium
($420) and Austria ($350). The Commissioner speculated that both the private and social cost of patenting were lower
in a system of impartial specialized examiners, than under a system where similar services were performed on a fee-
per-service basis by private solicitors.21
bear licensing or similar costs that would otherwise have been due if the inventor had been able to obtain a
patent in this country. In 1836, the stipulations on citizenship or residency were removed, but were
replaced with discriminatory patent fees: foreigners could obtain a patent in the U.S. for a fee of three
hundred dollars, or five hundred if they were British. The 1832 and 1836 laws stipulated that foreigners
had to exploit their patented invention within eighteen months. These clauses seem to have been interpreted
by the courts in a fairly liberal fashion, since alien patentees “need not prove that they hawked the patented
improvement to obtain a market for it, or that they endeavoured to sell it to any person, but that it rested
upon those who sought to defeat the patent to prove that the plaintiffs neglected or refused to sell the
patented invention for reasonable prices when application was made to them to purchase.”
17 Moreover, the
records indicate that a significant number of foreign inventors petitioned Congress and readily succeeded in
obtaining the right to patent their inventions in the United States.
Such discriminatory provisions proved to be temporary aberrations and were not included in
subsequent legislation. After 1861 patent rights were available to all applicants on the same basis without
regard to nationality. The patent record itself (Figure 1) reveals a likely reason for the liberal treatment of
foreign inventors: until the middle of the twentieth century there was relatively little patenting by foreigners
in the United States, largely because of the superiority of U.S. technologists and technologies. During the
proceedings to celebrate the centenary of the U.S. patent system, this “liberality” was noted as one of its
essential features: “Our law gives to all men of all nations the same privileges, and recognizes to the fullest
extent the international character of property in inventions. In this respect ... the United States may claim to
have led the world and to be leading it still” (Seeley, 1892).
Despite their common source in the intellectual property clause of the U.S. Constitution, copyright
policies provided a marked contrast to the patent system in the United States.
18 In the period before the
Declaration of Independence, although individual American states recognized and promoted copyright
protection, it was not considered to be of equal importance with innovation policies. First, in a democracy
17Tatham et al. v. Lowber et al., 23 F. Cas. 721April 21, 1847.
18See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 684 (1834): “It has been argued at the bar, that as the promotion of the progress
of science and the useful arts is here united in the same clause in the constitution, the rights of the authors and
inventors were considered as standing on the same footing; but this, I think, is a non sequiturfor when congress
came to execute this power by legislation, the subjects are kept distinct, and very different provisions are made
respecting them.”22
the claims of the public and the wish to foster freedom of expression were paramount. Second, to a new
colony, pragmatic concerns were likely of greater importance than the arts, and more substantial literary
works were imported from Europe. Demand was sufficiently shallow that an individual could saturate the
market with a first run printing, and most local publishers produced ephemera such as newspapers,
almanacs, and bills. Third, it was unclear that copyright protection was needed as an incentive for
creativity, especially since a significant fraction of output was devoted to works such as medical treatises
and religious tracts whose authors wished simply to maximize the number of readers, rather than the
amount of income they received.
The earliest federal statute to protect the product of authors was approved on May 31 1790, “for the
encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books to the authors and proprietors
of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.”
19 John Barry obtained the first federal copyright when
he registered his spelling book in the District Court of Pennsylvania and early grants reflected the same
utilitarian character. Policy makers felt that copyright protection would serve to increase the flow of
learning and information, and by encouraging publication would contribute to democratic principles of free
speech. The diffusion of knowledge would also ensure broad-based access to the benefits of social and
economic development.
In the case of patents, the rights of inventors, whether domestic or foreign, were widely viewed as
coincident with public welfare. In stark contrast, policymakers showed from the very beginning an acute
sensitivity to trade-offs between the rights of authors (or publishers) and social welfare. The protections
provided to authors under American copyright laws were as a result much more limited than those of most
European countries, which increasingly made grants on the basis of moral rights. Of relevance here are
stipulations regarding first sale, work for hire, and fair use. Under a moral rights-based system, an artist or
his heirs can claim remedies if subsequent owners alter or distort the work in a way that allegedly injures
the artist’s honour or reputation. According to the first sale doctrine, the copyright holder loses all rights
19The copyright act required authors and proprietors to deposit a copy of the title of their work in the office of the
district court in the area where they lived, for a nominal fee of sixty cents. Registration secured the right to print,
publish and sell maps, charts and books for a term of fourteen years, with the possibility of an extension for another
like term. Amendments to the original act extended protection to other works including musical compositions, plays
and performances, engravings and photographs. Legislators refused to grant perpetual terms, but the length of
protection was extended in the general revision of the laws in 1831, and 1909.23
after the work is sold. In the American system, if the copyright holder’s welfare were enhanced by
nonmonetary concerns, these individualized concerns could be addressed and enforced through contract
law, rather than through a generic federal statutory clause that would affect all property holders. Similarly,
“work for hire” doctrines repudiated the right of personality in favour of facilitating market transactions.
This difficult quest for balance between private and public good is most evident in the copyright
doctrine of “fair use” that (unlike patents) allowed unauthorized access to copyrighted works under certain
conditions. The fair use doctrine was initially articulated in England, but found its most expansive
elaboration in the American system as a way of ensuring that the monopoly costs of an exclusive right in
expression would be minimized. One of the striking features of the fair use doctrine is the extent to which
property rights were defined in terms of market valuations, or the impact on sales and profits, as opposed to
a clear holding of the exclusivity of property. Joseph Story ruled in Folsom v. Marsh [9 F. Cas. 342
(1841)]: “we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and objects of the selections
made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale,
or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.” Fair use doctrine thus illustrates
the extent to which the early policy makers weighed the costs and benefits of private property rights against
the rights of the public and the provisions for a democratic society. If copyrights were as strictly construed
as patents, it would serve to reduce scholarship, prohibit public access for noncommercial purposes,
increase transactions costs for potential users, and inhibit learning which the statutes were meant to
promote.
The basic dimensions of the copyright statute in its domestic provisions were not dissimilar to the
English Statute of Anne, but it included a startling innovation in the treatment of international copyright
protection. The 1790 Copyright Act specified that “nothing in this act shall be construed to extend to
prohibit the importation or vending, reprinting or publishing within the United States, of any map, chart,
book or books ... by any person not a citizen of the United States.” The U.S. was long a net importer of
literary and artistic works, especially from England, which implied that recognition of foreign copyrights
would have led to a net deficit in international royalty payments. The legislators explicitly acknowledged
the imbalance in the cultural ledger, and therefore authorized Americans to take free advantage of the24
cultural output of other countries.
20 The tendency to reprint foreign works was encouraged by the existence
of tariffs on imported books that ranged as high as 25 percent.
The United States stood out in contrast to countries such as France which prohibited counterfeiting
of both foreign and domestic works. Other countries which were affected by American “piracy” retaliated
by refusing to recognize American copyrights. Despite the lobbying of numerous authors and celebrities on
both sides of the Atlantic, the American copyright statutes did not allow for copyright protection of foreign
works for fully one century. As a result, the nineteenth century offers a colourful episode in the annals of
intellectual property, as American publishers and producers pirated foreign literature, art, and drama in
accordance with its own laws.
It is widely acknowledged that copyrights in books tended to be the concern of publishers rather
than of authors (although the two are naturally not independent of each other). As a result of the lack of
legal copyrights in foreign works, publishers raced to be first on the market with the “new” pirated books,
and the industry experienced several decades of intense, if not quite “ruinous” competition. These were
problems that publishers in England had faced before, in the market for uncopyrighted books, such as
Shakespeare and Fielding (Collins 1927). Their solution had been to collude in the form of strictly
regulated cartels or “printing congers,” which created divisible alienable property in books. Cooperation
resulted in risk sharing and a greater ability to cover expenses. The unstable races in the United States
similarly settled down during the 1840s to collusive standards that were termed “trade custom” or “courtesy
of the trade.”
The industry achieved relative stability because the dominant firms cooperated in establishing
synthetic property rights in foreign-authored books. American publishers made payments (termed
“copyrights”) to foreign authors to secure early sheets, and other firms recognized their exclusive property
in the “authorized reprint”. Advance payments to foreign authors not only served to ensure the coincidence
of publishers’ and authors’ interests – they were also recognized by “reputable” publishers as “copyrights.”
20 Senator John Ruggles was one of the leading authorities in Congress on the patent system and a strong proponent of
the 1836 changes in the patent law. He was also a key member of a committee to consider reforming international
copyrights, and argued that “American ingenuity in the arts and practical sciences would derive at least as much
benefit from international patent laws, as that of foreigners. Not so with authorship and book-making. The difference
is too obvious to admit of controversy” (Barnes 1974, 71).25
These exclusive rights were tradable, and enforced by threats of predatory pricing and retaliation. Such
practices suggest that publishers were able to simulate the legal grant through private means. However,
such private rights naturally did not confer property rights that could be enforced at law. The case of
Sheldon v. Houghton [21 F. Cas 1239 (1865)] illustrates that these rights were considered to be “very
valuable, and is often made the subject of contracts, sales, and transfers, among booksellers and publishers.”
The court pointed out that “if anything which can be called, in any legal sense, property, was transferred to
this partnership, this was based on the custom of the trade, which “is very far from being a legal custom,
furnishing a solid foundation upon which an inviolable title to property can rest, which courts can protect
from invasion. ... It may be an advantage to the party enjoying it for the time being, but its protection rests
in the voluntary and unconstrained forbearance of the trade. I know of no way in which the publishers of
this country can republish the works of a foreign author, and secure to themselves the exclusive right to
such publication ... For this court to recognize any other literary property in the works of a foreign author,
would contravene the settled policy of Congress.” Thus, synthetic rights differed from copyrights in the
degree of security that was offered by the enforcement power of the courts. Nevertheless, these title-
specific rights of exclusion decreased uncertainty, enabled publishers to recoup their fixed costs, and
avoided the wasteful duplication of resources that would otherwise have occurred.
It was not until 1891 that the Chace Act granted copyright protection to selected foreign residents.
Thus, after a century of lobbying by interested parties on both sides of the Atlantic, based on reasons that
ranged from the economic to the moral, copyright laws only changed when the United States became more
competitive in the international market for cultural goods. However, the act also included significant
concessions to domestic printers’ unions and printing establishments, in the form of “manufacturing
clauses.” Books had to be published in the U.S. before or at the same time as the publication date in its
country of origin. The work also had to be printed here, or printed from type set in the United States or
from plates made from type set in the United States. Copyright protection still depended on conformity with
stipulations such as formal registration of the work. These clauses resulted in U.S. failure to qualify for
admission to the Berne Convention until 1988, more than one hundred years after the first Convention for
the harmonization of international copyright laws.26
V. LOOKING BACKWARD
The framers of the American system of intellectual property intended to promote social progress in a
democratic society. This utilitarian objective explains the elements that were drawn from prior examples
across time and region, as well as the innovations in the design of the system. The framers wished to avoid
the “pernicious monopolies” that plagued the prior grant of privileges in Europe and American colonies,
hence the rejection of premiums and broad powers to encourage innovation. In the new Republic, only true
inventors were to be benefited, not importers, the well-connected or monopolists. In order to identify those
who deserved these rights, an examination system was instituted, and protection would be allowed to only
those inventions that were new to the world. Moreover, all inventors, not just the wealthy or well-
connected, would be allowed access to exclusive rights, and the determination of useful knowledge would
be left to the market rather than to judges or committees. Once granted to “meritorious patentees,” these
rights were not to be infringed on, either by other inventors, or by society itself in the form of working
requirements or price controls. The diffusion of information was ensured through the deposit of models and
information and publication of specifications.
As for copyright, the interests of authors were less aligned to those of a democratic society, which
had a critical interest in the diffusion of information, education and learning. Moreover, the European
experience raised concerns about the use of copyright powers to impose censorship and limit free speech.
Hence, Congress would be less generous in its provisions for the protection of authorship, allowing shorter
terms than in any other developed country, and requiring strict compliance with the statutory provisions, on
pain of annulment of the right. The judiciary likewise permitted unauthorized access to copyrighted
products through a stronger “fair use doctrine” than any that had previously existed. Moreover, effective
public policy required withholding protection to the rights of foreign authors while the balance of trade was
unfavourable to American citizens. Thus, for both patents and copyrights, the calibration of systemic
design was directed toward allowing rights to individuals in order to offer enough incentives for
productivity and creation, while ensuring that overall social welfare was enhanced through wider access to27
these cultural inventions. This calculus created property rights in patents that were the strongest in the
world, and a system of copyrights that were among the weakest in the world.
Comparisons across Europe and the United States suggest that their respective policy choices
regarding intellectual property affected the rate and direction of inventive activity. Differences in the
design of patent institutions were responsible in part for the contrasts in the American experience relative to
other countries. As Figure 1 shows, per capita rates of patenting in the United States grew rapidly, and
contemporary observers credited favourable institutions for its competitiveness. American technologies
were soon recognized as the most productive and innovative in the world. Patterns of inventors and
inventions were also affected by the intellectual property rules: U.S. inventors were drawn from a wider
spectrum of the population than in Europe, and inventiveness was also far more broadly distributed across
all industries. Markets in patent rights and patented inventions flourished, and this market-orientation was
especially beneficial to patentees who did not have the financial resources to exploit their patents. These
observations are consistent with the patterns of productivity and economic growth across countries. U.S.
productivity gains were evident in all sectors, even labour-intensive industries, and its growth were
balanced. In Britain, by contrast, patented inventions tended to be quite capital-intensive, and clustered in
a few industries such as steel and textiles; it is likely not coincidental that British productivity was lower,
limited to these few industries, and they experienced unbalanced economic growth.
The historical evidence regarding intellectual property and technological innovation therefore
strongly suggests that the design of rules and standards mattered. The U.S. patent system was universally
acknowledged to be the model prototype for the protection of inventions and inventors and in order to
benefit globally-competitive American patentees, the United States took the lead to encourage other
countries to strengthen their patent laws in line with American policies. However, we should not overlook
the fact that patent systems are embedded in a set of related institutions, such as the legal system, markets
for technology, and organizations that facilitate the acquisition of skills and learning. For, if other
institutions are not responsive and enabling, even a well-designed patent system can be ineffective. The
Founding Choices regarding intellectual property proved to be eminently favourable for social and
economic development, but the flexibility of these institutional mechanisms in accommodating change and28
new circumstances was equally important. When the British finally restructured their patent system in the
direction of the American system, reforms were limited by incapacity in other directions such as
unresponsive legal and educational institutions.
American exceptionalism was also evident in the area of copyrights, but in the opposite direction to
patents. The United States emphasized the importance of mass literacy and public education, and abridged
copyrights when a conflict might exist between learning and copyright. Thus, it lagged behind the rest of
the world in terms of both domestic and foreign copyright protection. Americans not only refused to
adhere to international copyright treaties long upheld by European countries, for a century they continued to
engage in copyright piracy of foreign cultural products even in the face of widespread protests and
condemnation. It is very likely that such American “copyright piracy” benefited the country initially when
the United States was a net debtor. But once the balance of trade moved in its favour, the United States had
an incentive to adopt stronger laws to protect its authors internationally. By way of contrast, European
policymakers regarded copyright owners as geniuses who were deserving of strong protection for the
products of their personality, and their copyright regimes evolved in the direction of inherent and
inalienable author’s rights. Consequently, France took the lead in promoting the harmonization in
international copyright laws. Today’s movement to harmonize patent and copyright laws can thus be traced
to these two separate sources that culminated in stipulations for a system of uniformly strong patents and
strong copyrights regardless of the level of economic development. Such a system did not exist anywhere in
the world during the period when countries enjoyed greater freedom to choose appropriate institutions.
In the United States of the 21
st century, as in the eighteenth century, there is no shortage of
proposals regarding policies that might best promote social and economic development. Ironically, in direct
contrast to the Founding Choices, the prevailing policies comprise measures that result in weak patents and
strong copyrights. The patent system has departed from the original objectives of the creators of the
system, with a faulty examination system, proposals to issue patents to first filers rather than to the first
inventor, judicial considerations of utility and creativity in determining validity, and patentable subject
matter held to include “anything under the sun” that man can create. A number of economists have been
persuaded by the superior theoretical properties of such alternative policy instruments as state-sponsored29
awards, buyouts and prizes, and some even echo nineteenth-century European advocates for the abolition of
intellectual property rights. The departures are even more blatant in the copyright regime. Today, copyright
laws are largely determined by industry lobbies bent on securing their own objectives, with few to defend
the public interest. Similarly, international copyright harmonization has created a mixed and muddled
domestic system that conflicts with the intent of the founders. The Supreme Court has approved a virtually
perpetual copyright and, rather than the public domain being the default, copyright is now the default.
Extensions to the power of copyright owners are now justified on the basis of the creativity of authors,
rather than the benefits to society. New technologies such as encryption and the threat of costly litigation
allow owners the ability to expand their rights of exclusion in ways that avoid the limitations and
constraints that the early laws incorporated to protect public welfare.
Thomas Jefferson pointed out that he was "not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws
and constitutions… But… laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human
mind.”
21 The extent to which institutions must alter to accommodate social and economic change is a subtle
question that admits of a number of equally valid and opposing answers. At the same time, it is always
worthwhile to reconsider the fundamental principles on which those laws and constitutions were originally
founded. Looking backward to that extraordinary summer in 1787, it is useful to speculate whether today’s
intellectual property institutions have diverged too far afield from the original founding choices that
comprised the constitutional blueprint for promoting the progress of science and useful arts.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Armstrong, Elizabeth, Before Copyright: The French Book-Privilege System, 1498-1526. Cambridge and
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Barnes, James J., Authors, Publishers, and Politicians: The Quest for an Anglo-American Copyright
Agreement, 1815-1854. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974.
Brock, R. A. (ed), Abstracts of Proceedings of the Virginia Company of London, vol. I. Richmond, VA:
Virginia Historical Society, 1888.
Bugbee, Bruce W, Genesis of American Patent and Copyright Law. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press,
1967.
21 In a letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1810. Available online at the Electronic Text Center, University of
Virginia Library.30
Clark, Victor, History of Manufactures in the United States, 1607-1860. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Institution, 1916, p. 34-35
Collins, A. S., Authorship in the Days of Johnson. London, Robert Holden and Co., 1927.
Cooper, Thomas (ed), Statutes at Large of South Carolina. Columbia, SC: Johnston, 1838 and 1839.
Coxe, Tench, "An Address to an Assembly of American Manufactures" American Museum, vol 2 (Sept)
1787, Philadelphia: Matthew Carey, 248-253.
Defebaugh, James E., History of the Lumber Industry of America, vol. 2. Chicago: American Lumberman,
1907.
Madison, James, The Federalist No. 43. New York: J. and A. McClean, 1788.
Farrand, Max, ed. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. Rev. ed. 4 vols. New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1937.
Ford, Worthington Chauncey Ford (ed), Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1779. Washington, DC
: Government Printing Office, 1905.
de Pauw, Linda (ed), Documentary History of the First Federal Congress, vol. 3. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1987.
Fox, Harold, Monopolies and Patents. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1947
Hilaire-Perez, Liliane, L'invention technique au siècle des Lumières. Paris : Albin Michel, 2000.
Hoffer, Peter Charles, Law and People in Colonial America. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1998.
Foley, John P. (ed), The Jeffersonian cyclopedia. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1900.
Khan, B. Zorina, The Democratization of Invention: Patents and Copyrights in American Economic
Development. New York: Cambridge University Press and NBER, 2005.
Khan, B. Zorina and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “The Early Development of Intellectual Property Institutions in
the United States,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 15 (3) 2001: 233-246.
Nelson, William E., The Common Law in Colonial America, Volume I: The Chesapeake and New England
1607-1660. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008
New York, Laws of the State of New York, vol. 1. Albany: Weed & Parsons, 1886.
Paine, Thomas, “A Letter Addressed to the Abbe Raynal, on the Affairs of North America, in Which the
Mistakes in the Abbe's Account of the Revolution of America Are Corrected and Cleared Up.” 1782,
available at www.gutenberg.org.
Commissioner of Patents, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Patents. Washington, D.C., Government
Printing Office, 1850.
Scientific American, “Government Rewards for Discoveries,” New York: March 27, 1852, 221.31
Seely, F. A. , “International Protection of Industrial Property,” in U.S. Patent Office, Proceedings and
Addresses: Celebration of the Beginning of the Second Century of the American Patent System.
Washington, D.C.: Gedney & Roberts, 1892.
Smith, Paul H., et al., eds. Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789, 25 volumes. Washington, D.C.:
Library of Congress, 1976-2000.
Solberg, Thorvald (ed), Copyright Enactments: 1783-1900. Copyright Office Bulletin No. 3. Washington,
D.C.: Library of Congress, 1900.
Story, Joseph. Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. 3 vols. Boston, 1833
Syrett, Harold C. et al. (eds), The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, 26 vols. New York and London: Columbia
University Press, 1961.
Towle, Nathaniel C., A History and Analysis of the Constitution of the United States. Boston: Little,
Brown, 1871.
Whitmore, William H., Biographical Sketch of the Laws of the Massachusetts Colony from 1630 to 1686.
Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1890.32
Figure 1















































Sources: U.S. Patent Office and Department of Census, various years. The data comprise patents
per million residents, with figures for domestic patents excluding patents filed by foreign residents.